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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SCHOOL INTEGRATION REFORM —A CALL 
FOR DESEGREGATION POLICIES THAT ARE MORE THAN SKIN DEEP 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With race conscious desegregation laws being eliminated by judicial 
decisions, how should central Arkansas schools respond to prevent a new 
era of segregation? Arkansas has been home to some of the most notorious 
desegregation litigation in the nation’s history. The Little Rock Nine have 
been the topic of films, books, and many scholarly writings.1 Cooper v. Aa-
ron is a staple in constitutional law books.2 Nearly fifty years have passed 
since Brown v. Board of Education, yet desegregation is still on the fore-
front of Arkansas litigation.3 
In 1989, the Little Rock School District reached a settlement agreement 
that put three Pulaski County school districts under judicial supervision and 
required state funding to facilitate desegregation.4 The school districts con-
tinue to receive millions of dollars under the settlement agreement; however, 
recently, the Little Rock and North Little Rock School Districts were re-
leased from judicial supervision because the schools had obtained unitary 
status.5 Pulaski County Special School District was not.6 
 
 1. See Ernest Green, LITTLE ROCK NINE FOUND., http://littlerock9.com/ErnestGreen.a 
spx (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). After schools were ordered to desegregate in Brown v. Board 
of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), Little Rock Schools attempted integration. History, 
LITTLE ROCK NINE FOUND. Nine African-American students were registered to attend Little 
Rock Central High. Id. Governor Orval Faubus deployed the Arkansas National Guard to 
physically prevent the nine students from entering the school. Id. The U.S. Army was re-
quired to intervene and allow the students access to the school. Id. 
 2. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). After the decision in Brown, the Arkansas 
Governor and Legislature attempted to circumvent the ruling by passing legislation to perpet-
uate the dual school system. Id.at 8; see also Brown, 349 U.S. at 300–01. The school board 
requested that the desegregation efforts be delayed due to the resistance created by the state. 
Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4.The Court noted that the school board had acted in good faith, but the 
deadline would not be extended due to the bad actions of the Governor and the Legislature. 
Id. The most important question answered in the case was that the states were bound by the 
Court’s ruling. Id. at 18. 
 3. See Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (f)(1) unconstitutional); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 
F.3d 738, 748 (8th Cir. 2011) (declaring the North Little Rock School District unitary). 
 4. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1376 
(8th Cir. 1990). 
 5. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748. “[A] school district has achieved ‘unitary 
status’ when it is devoid of racial discrimination with regard to: (1) student assignment; (2) 
faculty and staff; (3) transportation; (4) extracurricular activities; and (5) facilities.” Little 
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As a result of the districts’ unitary status, Little Rock and North Little 
Rock schools are neither under a court order to desegregate, nor are they 
constitutionally required to continue integration. Ironically, as a result of its 
denial of unitary status, Pulaski County School District can still receive state 
funds under the agreement. In short, regardless of the school’s status under 
the settlement agreement, none of the Pulaski County school districts have 
an incentive to continue integration efforts. 
Is the Arkansas education system being held hostage by the unintended 
consequences of state intervention,7 or has Arkansas simply failed to tap 
new resources? This note argues that the 1989 Settlement Agreement and 
other race-conscious measures are an outdated way to protect equality inter-
ests in the educational system and recommends a new form of integration in 
Pulaski County’s public schools: socioeconomic redistricting. This note 
suggests that parents, educators, and administrators in Pulaski County have 
the opportunity to encourage new legislation that factors more than race into 
the equality equation. 
First, this note will discuss recent rulings by the Supreme Court of the 
United States and the impact that the law has on Arkansas’s educational 
system.8 Next, the note will discuss the 1989 Settlement Agreement and 
other state laws aimed at Arkansas schools.9 Part III will discuss how socio-
economic redistricting is a race-neutral alternative that will not only im-
prove the quality of education, but also improve diversity within each school 
district.10 
Education equality has been and will forever be the focus of parents 
and legislatures.11 In Arkansas, it seems radical to discuss education policies 
that do not focus on race because of the deeply-rooted history of segrega-
tion. Across the nation, however, the focus has shifted to the new concern of 
wealth disparities.12 The emerging issue in equality is not limited to what 
 
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (E.D. Ark. 
2002) aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2004). 
North Little Rock School District is completely unitary, while Pulaski County Special School 
District is unitary in all but nine areas. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748. 
 6. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 748. 
 7. See Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 504 
(2010) (“Since the United States began to enforce the prohibition on de jure school segrega-
tion, the territorially sovereign district, . . . has been a preeminent tool for resisting the racial 
integration of schools.”). 
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. The plethora of case law regarding segregation and the movement to school finance 
litigation shows the continued demand to “equalize the distribution of educational resources.” 
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252 (1999). 
 12. Education and Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N., http://www.apa. 
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skin color a person is born with, but concerns how many opportunities a 
person’s wealth affords him or her.13 The desegregation policies created half 
a century ago can be updated and improved to address the new hurdle to 
providing equality in Arkansas education. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Although school policies are thought of as purely a local matter, equal 
access to education is a constitutional right.14 As the Supreme Court of the 
United States declared fifty years ago, “[I]n the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”15 Yet, in the years following 
that clear statement, the Supreme Court has had to revisit the topic of segre-
gation multiple times.16 Suddenly, what seemed to be a simple order to inte-
grate became a complex set of constitutional rights and remedies.17 To pro-
pose an effective and legal change to central Arkansas school policies, one 
must be mindful of 1) the constitutional requirements and limitations; and 2) 
the current settlement agreement between the Little Rock, North Little 
Rock, and Pulaski County Special School Districts. 
 
org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-education.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). “Ineq-
uities in wealth distribution, resource distribution, and quality of life are increasing in the 
United States and globally.” Id. 
 13. See Kelley Holland, Class System? When It Comes to School Aid, Rich Have the 
Edge, CNBC (Aug. 1, 2013, 5:55 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100930851. The article 
notes that because students from more affluent backgrounds have better chances of obtaining 
scholarships, “‘the nation’s public and private four-year colleges and universities are in dan-
ger of shutting down what has long been a pathway to the middle class’. . . .” Id. 
 14. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1958). In a later case, the Court reiterated that 
“[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement 
educational policy,” but if school authorities have a duty to desegregate “judicial authority 
may be invoked.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971). 
 15. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I]. A year 
following that ruling the Supreme Court ordered schools begin integration with “all deliber-
ate speed.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. Some schools districts have been litigating the Court’s ruling for nearly fifty years. 
See infra Part II.B. The Supreme Court has heard either school segregation or an affirmative 
action case every decade since Brown I’s ruling. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 
S.Ct. 2411 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
267 (1986); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 
U.S. 430 (1968). 
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A.  The Constitutional Requirements of Desegregation 
In Brown I, the Court set out to eliminate segregated or dual school 
systems.18 To achieve this goal, the Supreme Court ordered that the state has 
an affirmative duty to create a unitary system;19 however, the Court limited 
the states’ attempts to integrate in three key ways.20 First, a state is required 
to remedy only segregation caused by state action.21 Second, the remedy is 
limited to the district where the violation occurred.22 Finally, when a state 
uses a race-based remedy to combat segregation, the remedy must survive a 
strict scrutiny analysis.23 
1. Limits Based on State Action 
A state is obligated to remedy past segregation only if it is caused by 
state action, often referred to by the courts as de jure segregation.24 De jure 
segregation can mean a statutory scheme that created a dual school system, 
or it can mean action by the state or school board that has “(1) a racially 
discriminatory purpose and (2) a causal relationship between the acts com-
plained of and the racial imbalance.”25 School districts have no duty to cor-
rect segregation caused by the free choices made by the citizens of that 
state.26 This type of segregation is called de facto segregation.27 
Although de facto segregation is caused by many factors,28 the key dis-
tinction between it and de jure segregation is that de facto segregation can-
not be attributed to “discriminatory action of state authorities.”29 For exam-
 
 18. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495; Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that “[t]he objective today 
remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.”). 
 19. Green, 391 U.S. at 437 (“School boards . . . operating state-compelled dual systems 
were . . . charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to con-
vert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 
branch.”). 
 20. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 21. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189. 
 22. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 717–18 (1974). 
 23. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
 24. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189. 
 25. Id. at 207. The Constitutional inquiry of whether the state has committed de jure 
segregation is a district-by-district analysis; however, if a plaintiff shows intentional segrega-
tive actions in a “meaningful portion of a school system,” then a burden shifting presumption 
is created. Id. at 208. The school board will have the burden of proving other districts were 
not victim to intentional segregation. Id. 
 26. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Segregation can be caused by “‘housing patterns, employment practices, economic 
conditions, and social attitudes.’” Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 760 (quoting the dissent, id. 
at 838–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 29. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. 
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ple, state action can include structuring attendance zones on the basis of race 
or building fixed-size schools located in African American residential areas 
to influence the racial composition of the schools, but does not include the 
existence of a single race school due to neighborhood residential patterns.30 
Without some type of state action, courts are not permitted to order remedies 
for segregated schools.31 
2. School District Boundary Limits 
Once a school is shown to have suffered from the effects of de jure seg-
regation,32 the remedy must be limited to the scope of the violation.33 The 
Court uses school district boundaries as a guideline to define the scope of 
the remedy.34 Violations that occur within a school district, intra-district 
violations, require intra-district remedies.35 The Court chose school district 
boundaries as a guideline to avoid the logistical concerns of restructuring 
many different schools and to maintain the benefits of providing local con-
trol.36 
For example, in Michigan, the state faced the problem of segregation in 
Detroit’s inner-city school districts.37 The state created attendance zones that 
encompassed newly created suburban school districts to remedy the segrega-
tion.38 The plan called for the consolidation of fifty-four school districts into 
 
 30. Id. at 20–21, 25. 
 31. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973). 
 32. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18. “[E]xisting policy and practice with regard to faculty, staff, 
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities were among the most important indicia 
of a segregated system.” Id. 
 33. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974). 
 34. Id. The Court found school district lines significant because the boundary lines were 
not a creation of mere convenience, but a “deeply rooted tradition” that cannot be ignored. Id. 
at 719, 741–42. 
 35. Id. at 744. 
 36. Id. at 743. The benefits of local control include “afford[ing] citizens an opportunity 
to participate in decision-making, permit[ting] the structuring of school programs to fit local 
needs, and encourag[ing] ‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educa-
tional excellence.’” Id. at 742 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 50 (1973)). In contrast, the Court noted that a multidistrict plan did not address matters 
related to the status and operation of the current school board, taxes, and large scale transpor-
tation needs. Id. at 743. 
 37. Id. at 729–30. The problem of segregation between districts rather than within was 
more common place in the northern metropolitan schools, where school districts were drawn 
based on smaller municipalities rather than large counties. Dana Russo, Note, School Deseg-
regation: From Topeka, Kansas to Wake County, North Carolina—Changing the Path, but 
Staying the Course, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 535, 538 (2012). 
 38. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 730 (calling the solution an “implementation of a multidistrict, 
metropolitan area remedy”). 
128 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
a “vast new super school district.”39 The Court found the plan unconstitu-
tional.40 Although inner-city districts suffered from the effects of de jure 
segregation, the suburban districts, being newly created, did not have a his-
tory of de jure segregation.41 Ultimately, the Court limited when the state 
may undertake large scale reforms by finding that a multidistrict remedy 
was appropriate only when a constitutional violation in one district causes a 
“significant segregative effect in another district.”42 
3. Limits of Strict Scrutiny 
When the state creates a law based on race, the Court determines 
whether the law is constitutional using a strict scrutiny standard.43 In educa-
tion cases, states have often used remedies that utilize individualized, race-
based classifications to combat segregation.44 Although this is an affirmative 
effort to integrate, the strict scrutiny standard is applied regardless of wheth-
er the plan seeks to include or exclude.45 The Court will even use a strict 
scrutiny analysis on a race-neutral law, but only if the Court finds that the 
law has a racially discriminatory purpose.46 
In order to pass strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve 
a compelling government interest.47 In education cases, the Court has recog-
nized only two interests as compelling.48 First, remedying de jure segrega-
tion is a compelling government interest that was established by the Brown I 
decision and the litigation that followed.49 The second recognized interest is 
 
 39. Id. at 743. 
 40. Id. at 745. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. The Court did note that “an interdistrict remedy might be in order where the 
racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial segregation in an 
adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn on the basis of race.” Id. 
However, this was not the case in Detroit. The suburban schools districts were not causing 
the segregation in the inner-city schools. Id. The creation of the suburban school districts was 
not a result of purposeful state action, but more likely because of residential patterns, or de 
facto segregation. Id. 
 43. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). In equal protection cases the Court 
uses a more “searching judicial scrutiny.” Id. The analysis has a reputation for disfavoring the 
state so much that the phrase “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” has been quoted time and time 
again by the Court. See id. 
 44. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599–600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, 
must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race”). 
 47. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. 
 48. See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 49. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. 
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achieving diversity.50 If the state demonstrates that it has a compelling inter-
est, the law must still be narrowly tailored to fit that interest.51 Narrow tai-
loring requires a “serious, good faith consideration of workable, race-neutral 
alternatives.”52 
The Court recognizes that the state has a compelling interest in reme-
dying past discrimination.53 When a school is declared unitary, however, the 
school no longer can use race-based efforts to remedy de jure discrimina-
tion.54 While recognizing that the state has an affirmative duty to act, the 
Court held that once the school is unitary, the use of individualized race-
based classifications can no longer be justified.55 
For example, the Jefferson County school district in Lexington, Ken-
tucky was once under a court decree to desegregate.56 After achieving uni-
tary status, the school district implemented a race-based plan that required 
minimum minority enrollment that prohibited transfers of certain students 
on the basis of racial guidelines.57 The Court found the plan unconstitution-
al, and the school was prohibited from using it, even though one year prior, 
the school district was required to maintain policies to desegregate the 
schools.58 
The only other compelling interest the Court has found is achieving di-
versity.59 The Court held constitutional a law school’s policy that used race 
as a factor in admission.60 This holding, although limited to higher education 
by the Court, has been applied to primary and secondary schools.61 Although 
 
 50. Id. at 722. This interest is limited both in scope and in longevity. See infra notes 59–
69 and accompanying text. 
 51. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. 
 52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). A district court in Arkansas found a 
law that limited school transfer based on the race of the student had a compelling interest, but 
was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored. Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of 
Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. 
Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013). The court called the law a “blanket rule” that used only 
race as a criteria. Id. at 1066. The court stated the law must “employ a more nuanced, indi-
vidualized evaluation of the school and student needs” in order to be narrowly tailored. Id. at 
1068. 
 53. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. This is referred to above as de jure segregation. 
 54. Id. at 720–21. 
 55. Id. at 721. 
 56. Id. at 720–21. 
 57. Id. at 716. 
 58. Id. at 747–48. 
 59. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 60. Id. at 343. This matter was recently heard by the Supreme Court. Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (vacating and remanding to the Court of Appeals due 
to an incorrect application of strict scrutiny). 
 61. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725 (“The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key 
limitations on its holding—defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the 
unique context of higher education . . . .”). Although this ruling was limited to higher educa-
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this decision has been applied beyond the scope the Court imposed, the ex-
pansive application of Grutter v. Bollinger may be short lived.62 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,63 the University of Texas’s 
admission plan automatically admitted students that graduated in the top ten 
percent of their high school class.64 The rest of the applicants were evaluated 
with a process that considered race as one of many factors to encourage di-
versity among admitted students.65 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
the plan constitutional as a matter of law by applying strict scrutiny, while 
being “mindful of a university’s academic freedom.”66 
The Petitioner appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court, 
and many anticipated that Grutter v. Bollinger67 would be overturned, thus 
eliminating diversity as a compelling interest.68 The Court remanded the 
case back for a strict scrutiny review that is not “strict in theory but feeble in 
fact,”69 emphasizing the need for close analysis of race-conscious plans.70 
Though the Court declined to overrule Grutter because the parties did not 
ask the Court to do so,71 the opinion left open the possibility that future reli-
ance on race-conscious plans would be improvident.72 
 
tion in Parents Involved, federal district courts have used the Grutter reasoning in cases re-
garding primary schools. See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, New York Sch. Dist. No. 
21, 536 F. Supp. 2d 274, 283 (E.D. N.Y. 2008). Judge Jack Weinstein wrote in the opinion, 
“[t]he same considerations that permit race as one factor among many that may be considered 
in college and graduate schools under Grutter . . . should be applied to grade schools . . . .” 
Id. 
 62. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“There is disa-
greement about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal protection in 
approving this compelling interest in diversity.”). 
 63. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 64. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 235 (5th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 1536, (2012) and vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 65. Id. at 235–36. 
 66. Id. at 234. 
 67. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 68. Lyle Denniston, Opinion recap: More rigorous race review, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 
24, 2013, 1:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-recap-more-rigorous-race-
review/. 
 69. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
Once the University has established that its goal of diversity is consistent with 
strict scrutiny, however, there must still be a further judicial determination that 
the admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its implementation. The Universi-
ty must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are nar-
rowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University receives no deference. 
Id. at 2419–20. 
 70. Id. at 2419. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 2422. (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I would overrule [Grutter], and hold that 
a State’s use of race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by 
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B. Desegregation in Arkansas 
After the Supreme Court of the United States ordered integration in 
Brown I, the Arkansas government resisted desegregation.73 In 1956, the 
Arkansas Constitution was amended to oppose the desegregation decisions 
made by the Supreme Court.74 The Supreme Court ruled that state officials 
must obey judicial orders.75 The Little Rock schools allowed minority stu-
dents to enter, but the resistance to integration continued until the 1980s.76 
Thirty years of ineffective efforts and resistance culminated in a federal law-
suit between the Little Rock, North Little Rock, and Pulaski County Special 
School Districts.77 
1. The 1989 Settlement Agreement 
Despite many efforts to maintain integrated schools, Little Rock 
schools suffered from “severe financial problems and an eroding financial 
base.”78 The Little Rock School District complained that school district 
boundaries were purposely maintained to prevent integration— while the 
city grew,79 the school district did not.80 Attractive residential areas that 
counted as part of the city of Little Rock were not included in the city’s 
 
the Equal Protection Clause.”); Denniston, supra note 68 (“[T]he tone of the opinion would 
seem to invite such further testing” of race-conscious plans.). 
 73. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 413 
(8th Cir. 1985). 
 74. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1958). The state opposed desegregation by “‘en-
acting laws, calling out troops, making statements vilifying federal law and federal courts, 
and failing to utilize state law enforcement agencies and judicial processes to maintain public 
peace.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)). Little 
Rock schools, both majority and minority, were closed completely for a year. Little Rock Sch. 
Dist., 778 F.2d at 415. The state even passed legislation to garner funding for litigating its 
position in opposing integration. Id. at 414. 
 75. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. The Eighth Circuit summed up Cooper’s holding by stating 
that “public opposition to desegregation of the races, no matter how deeply entrenched, could 
not be allowed to interfere with the full realization of the constitutional rights of black citi-
zens.” Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1376 
(8th Cir. 1990). 
 76. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 417. 
 77. See id. These three districts are located in Pulaski County Arkansas, the state’s most 
populous county. Id. at 408. 
 78. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 
(E.D. Ark. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
 79. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 419. 
 80. Id. (noting that at that time had the district grown as the city “the black-white ratio in 
the Little Rock schools would now be sixty-forty rather than seventy-thirty.”). 
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school district, but rather in Pulaski County Special School District.81 Addi-
tionally, Pulaski County closed minority schools and built newer schools in 
suburban areas that were remote and inaccessible to minority students.82 
The litigation revealed not only purposeful blocks to integration, but 
also a disturbing trend of minority students receiving grossly inadequate 
educational opportunities.83 In the pre-Brown I era, per pupil expenditures in 
minority schools were significantly less than other schools.84 Post Brown I, 
segregated county schools received more state aid than city schools.85 Inte-
grated schools were more likely to label minority students as learning disa-
bled, and less likely to offer extracurricular activities to minority students.86 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the school districts had 
violated the law, and an inter-district remedy was warranted because the 
boundary manipulation in Pulaski County “had a substantial interdistrict 
segregative effect.”87 The ruling was highly contested,88 but finally, the 
schools consented to a plan the court termed the 1989 Settlement Agree-
ment.89 The court considered the plan to be a “complete cure for all interdis-
trict violations.”90 The agreement would allow school administrators to fo-
cus on education—not litigation.91 
The Settlement Agreement focused on the creation of magnet schools, 
voluntary transfers, and state funding.92 The districts agreed that Pulaski 
County Special School District would create two types of magnet schools.93 
The first would be a school that enrolled minority students from the Little 
Rock School District and majority students from the Pulaski County Dis-
trict.94 The other would be themed magnet schools that would entice parents 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 420. 
 83. Id. at 412. 
 84. Id. In the pre-Brown I era, Little Rock became known as the only Arkansas school 
district that offered educational opportunities for minority students, prompting many minority 
students to transfer to Little Rock schools. Id. at 418–19. 
 85. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d at 420. 
 86. Id. at 422. 
 87. Id. at 419 (meeting the “significant segregative effect in another district” require-
ment set out in Milliken). 
 88. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F. 2d 1371, 
1376 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that the ruling was followed by ten appeals.). 
 89. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 757 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 90. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d at 1377. 
 91. Id. at 1394. 
 92. Id. at 1379–80. 
 93. Id. at 1379. “‘[M]agnet schools,’ . . . as their name suggests, aim to provide such 
improved educational quality that whites as well as blacks will be drawn to attend them.” 
Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 728, 763 (1986). 
 94. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d at 1379. 
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of all races to enroll their students because of the schools’ special offer-
ings.95 The plan allowed the district to convert some of the non-magnet 
schools into “incentive schools” that would be comprised of nearly all mi-
nority students, but would receive “special compensatory-education pro-
grams and markedly increased amounts of money.”96 
In addition to the creation of magnet schools, the plan also allowed for 
voluntary school choice, which allowed students to transfer into the school 
district of their choice.97 The agreement gave control of the school’s integra-
tion efforts to the judicial branch.98 Finally, the plan would require the state 
to pay over $100 million to the schools over a ten-year period.99 
2. Current Status 
In order to be released from the Settlement Agreement, the schools 
must petition the court.100 The court reviews several key areas of the Settle-
ment Agreement and decides if the school has reasonably complied with the 
agreement.101 Currently, the Little Rock School District is unitary,102 and the 
North Little Rock School District has been declared unitary in all areas as 
well.103 Pulaski County Special School District is unitary in all areas but 
nine.104 
Currently, the state continues to pay $38 million per year to the three 
districts to fund the schools’ desegregation efforts.105 Arkansas has made 
clear that unitary schools would no longer receive this type of funding.106 In 
2011, a federal district court released the state from its funding obligation, 
but the appellate court reversed.107 The trial court noted that the additional 
funding could encourage school districts to delay integration.108 Although 
 
 95. Id. at 1389. 
 96. Id. at 1379. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at1383. 
 99. Id. at 1381. 
 100. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 744 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. N. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 103. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 744–48 (reversing the trial court’s decision to 
deny unitary status in the area of staff recruitment to North Little Rock). 
 104. Id. at 748–57. 
 105. Id. at 757. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., No. 4:82cv00866 BSM, 
2011 WL 1935332, at *54 (E.D. Ark. May 19, 2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Little Rock Sch. 
Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 108. Id. The trial court referred to the funding as using the “carrot and stick approach . . . 
but that the districts are wise mules that have learned how to eat the carrot and sit down on 
the job.” Id. 
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the appellate court reinstated the funding, the court agreed that the funding 
created a “perverse incentive[]” to not integrate.109 
In 2013, the Arkansas Legislature repealed the Arkansas Public School 
Choice Act of 1989110 after a district court found the law unconstitutional.111 
The original law provided students an opportunity to transfer to the district 
of their choice as long as the students did not move from a district where 
their race was the minority to a district where their race was the majority.112 
The court applied strict scrutiny because the law used race as a remedy.113 
The court found the state had a compelling interest in remedying past dis-
crimination but overturned the law because it was not narrowly tailored.114 
The Arkansas legislature reacted by passing a law that does not use a stu-
dent’s race when approving transfers, but does exclude school districts from 
transfers if those districts are under a desegregation order, like the Settle-
ment Agreement.115 Accordingly, because it has not obtained unitary sta-
tus,116 students in the Pulaski County Special School District do not have the 
option to transfer to the school of their choice. 
III. ARGUMENT 
As one commenter noted, “[i]n spite of more than a century of activism 
seeking equal schooling for African American children, America’s schools 
remain substantially segregated and unequal.”117 Integration has failed for 
many reasons, both legal and social. The reasons for the impact of failed 
integration are tied to funding and educational quality, race and poverty, and 
the fact that schools are under no obligation to remedy all types of segrega-
 
 109. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 664 F.3d at 758. 
 110. Schools and School Districts—Public School Choice Act of 2013, 2013 Ark. Acts 
1227 (2013) (repealing ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (2007)). 
 111. Teague ex rel. T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-206 (f)(1) (2007) (repealed 2013). 
 113. Teague, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
 114. Id. at 1066. 
 115. 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 at sec. 6 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-1901 to -1909 
(Supp. 2013)). 
 116. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 
(E.D. Ark. 2002) aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
 117. Molly Townes O’Brien, Desegregation and the Struggle for Equal Schooling: Roll-
ing the Rock of Sisyphus, in OUR PROMISE: ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR 
AMERICA’S CHILDREN 3, 23 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009). “[M]any 
schools—especially those located in urban communities—are more segregated today than 
they were prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision.” Eboni S. Nelson, The Availa-
bility and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. REV. 841, 
841–42 (2008). 
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tion.118 The solution to the problem of quality education in the Little Rock, 
North Little Rock, and Pulaski County Special School Districts is to imple-
ment socioeconomic redistricting. 
A. Integration Plateaus 
The Supreme Court’s limitation on legal remedies and voluntary deseg-
regation plans has resulted in the re-segregation of many American cities.119 
As time passes, the vestiges of state-created segregation have almost been 
eliminated, yet the country continues to have racially isolated schools.120 
Schools across the country have become more segregated, not because of 
state action, but because of de facto segregation.121 The combined effect has 
led one commenter to note that “[m]andatory racial desegregation has al-
most run its course.”122 
Due to legal limits on when a state may combat segregation, wealthier 
families have the option to avoid integrated schools simply by moving to the 
suburbs where dual systems never existed, but low socioeconomic classes 
and minorities are not represented.123 Accordingly, inner-city schools are left 
with high concentrations of low-income minority students while the suburbs 
are home to wealthier, segregated schools.
 124 
 
 118. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 119. Osamudia R. James, Closing the Door on Public School Integration: Parents In-
volved and the Supreme Court’s Continued Neglect of Adequacy Concerns, in OUR PROMISE: 
ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 215, 215 (Maurice R. Dyson 
& Daniel B. Weddle eds., 2009). 
 120. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 291, 294 (Gary 
Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, & Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
Orfield, Segregated Housing] (“Even where extensive desegregation was achieved under an 
old court order, racial integration was threatened by the spread of minority segregation in city 
neighborhoods and the continuous construction of new all-white suburbs.”). 
 121. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitu-
tional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 374 (2012) (“Schools are as racially seg-
regated today as they were four decades ago . . . .”). In the Parents Involved decision, Justice 
Kennedy in a concurring opinion feared the plurality was ignoring the impact of de facto 
segregation in school districts. 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 122. Black, supra note 121, at 374. 
 123. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 87 (1995) (noting the Court does not find a viola-
tion just because of a racial imbalance in a school without a showing of something more); see 
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1551 
(2007) [hereinafter Kahenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration]. Kahlenberg argues that 
this view is acceptable to society because of the “deeply held notion that wealthy parents 
have a right to purchase homes in affluent neighborhoods and send their children to public 
schools that in effect exclude less well-off children.” Id. 
 124. Ryan, supra note 11, at 272. “Roughly two-thirds of black students attend elemen-
tary and secondary school in central-city districts.” Id. 
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Social influences have contributed to re-segregation as well. Patterns in 
housing have become less integrated.125 Economic factors affect minorities’ 
ability to purchase homes in more affluent areas, which has impacted the 
demographic makeup of neighborhoods.126 African Americans face disad-
vantages in receiving loans to purchase homes in wealthier neighbor-
hoods.127 Furthermore, African Americans suffer from an income gap that 
affects their ability to build the assets required for social mobility.128 Since 
many school districts rely on neighborhood districts,129 the outcome is sim-
ple: if we live segregated, we learn segregated. 
The judicial system has avoided regulating all causes of residential seg-
regation.130 The Supreme Court has referred to the phenomenon as a product 
of “demographic forces” rather than addressing the historical impact of seg-
regation that has fostered the current demographic makeup of the country.131 
One author has gone so far as criticizing the court’s decisions for “en-
shrin[ing] ‘choice,’ for those who can afford it, and deem[ing] marginaliza-
tion or exclusion acceptable for the less fortunate other.”132 Another expla-
nation, however, may be that the courts have been reluctant to challenge de 
facto segregation because of the implications of finding a legal harm in ra-
cial isolation itself, rather than in the state’s action of segregating stu-
dents.133 
Even though schools still suffer from segregation, administrators are 
restricted in the voluntary use of integration plans. The state has no constitu-
 
 125. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 291. 
 126. John A. Powell & Rebecca High, The Common Schools Democracy Requires: Ex-
panding Membership through Inclusive Education, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING 
THE PROMISE OF RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 265, 269–70 (Erica Frankenberg & 
Gary Orfield eds., 2007). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. at 269. 
 129. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569 (noting 
“roughly three quarters of American students attend neighborhood public schools”). 
 130. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 292–95. See also Missouri v. Jen-
kins, 515 U.S. 70, 96 (1995) (“The record here does not support the District Court’s reliance 
on ‘white flight’ as a justification for a permissible expansion of its intradistrict remedial 
authority through its pursuit of desegregative attractiveness”). 
 131. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 296–97. Orfield refers to the pat-
terns in housing as a “residential apartheid.” Id. at 299. 
 132. Powell & High, supra note 126, at 270. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell voiced 
a similar sentiment in his concurring opinion in the Keyes decision. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
413 U.S. 189, 219 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Pow-
ell stated “if our national concern is for those who attend [segregated] schools, rather than for 
perpetuating a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality, we must recognize that 
the evil of operating separate schools is no less in Denver than in Atlanta.” Id. 
 133. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 115 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made clear that findings of harm in a racially isolated 
school rest on the assumption that a predominantly minority school is inferior. Id. at 114–15. 
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tional duty to combat de facto segregation.134 If a state does endeavor to ad-
dress segregation, any state law using race will be tested with strict scruti-
ny.135 Because the only compelling interest likely to pass strict scrutiny is 
combating de jure segregation, a school can only combat segregation by 
using race is if the district is constitutionally required to eliminate the segre-
gation. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that even when inner-city dis-
tricts can prove a de jure violation, the city may not be able to actually com-
bat the segregation in a meaningful way.136 
In Arkansas, the legal impact has been significant. More of Arkansas’s 
schools have become unitary.137 Such schools, therefore, may not make ef-
forts to integrate using race-based criteria under Supreme Court prece-
dent.138 Even Arkansas’s Public School Choice Law was found unconstitu-
tional under the strict scrutiny standard.139 Each decision points to the con-
clusion that the use of race in Arkansas school legislation is coming to an 
end, but problems of segregation still exist. 
B. The Impact of Isolation 
Minority students suffer disproportionately from the effects of racial 
isolation. Although wealth disparities in general have grown, race and pov-
erty are especially linked.140 In Pulaski County Special School District’s 
effort to attain unitary status, the district had to demonstrate its efforts to 
implement a plan to address the achievement gap of African-American stu-
dents.141 The district presented evidence that any plan would be futile be-
 
 134. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Although under no affirmative duty to desegregate in a de facto 
area, Justice Kennedy argued it is a mistake that “[schools] must accept the status quo of 
racial isolation . . . .” Id. 
 135. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 136. Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 294. Orfield writes about the impact 
of the Milliken ruling on the Detroit School District noting that “Detroit was the nation’s 
second most segregated metropolitan area a generation after [the post Milliken remedy was 
instated].” Id. 
 137. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 758 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding 
North Little Rock School District unitary). 
 138. See supra Part II. 
 139. Teague ex rel T.T. v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 873 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069 (W.D. Ark. 
2012), vacated as moot sub nom. Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 140. Black, supra note 121, at 404. Black notes the achievement gap between minority 
and majority students is the equivalent of two or three grade years; however, “[r]esearch 
indicates that much of this achievement gap is not based on race itself, but is largely attribut-
able to the fact that predominately minority schools are also overwhelmingly high-poverty 
schools . . . .” Id. 
 141. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1023 
(E.D. Ark. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 359 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
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cause “the current socioeconomic differences between African-Americans 
and whites make it impossible to eliminate the achievement gap.”142 The 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district’s failure to imple-
ment a plan aimed solely at African American students warranted a denial of 
unitary status.143 The court required the school to make a good faith effort to 
implement a plan targeted at race, “regardless of whether [the plan] eventu-
ally bear[s] fruit.”144 
Furthermore, segregated schools are more likely to be low-income 
schools.145 One author noted that minorities made up “80 percent of all stu-
dents in schools with poverty rates of 90 percent or more.”146 Low income 
schools have lower test scores, higher drop-out rates, lower parental in-
volvement, fewer connections to higher education, and lower quality teacher 
retention.147 The lack of experienced qualified teachers plagues lower in-
come schools.148 Families are less likely to have the finances for academic 
support.149 As a result, minorities suffer far more from the harmful effects of 
segregation. 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has acknowledged the impact of high 
poverty schools, and the Legislature has addressed the issue through in-
creased funding.150 The Legislature enacted bills that provided incentives for 
teachers to relocate to areas with high concentrations of poverty.151 In addi-
tion, the General Assembly increased school funding by nearly 18% through 
increased taxes in order to provide all Arkansas students with an adequate 
 
 142. Id. at 1073. 
 143. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 756–57 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 144. Id. at 757. 
 145. Powell & High, supra note 126, at 269. 
 146. Id. at 270; see also Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, 
at 1545. “Minority students are almost three times as likely as white students to be low-
income.” Id. 
 147. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration through Public School 
Choice: A Progressive Alternative to Vouchers, 45 HOW. L.J. 247, 250–52 (2002) [hereinafter 
Kahlenberg, Public School Choice]. 
 148. One study showed that in low-income schools 27% of the math teachers actually 
majored in mathematics compared to 43% in middle income schools. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N., supra note 12. 
 149. Id. This page notes that studies show a correlation between availability of books, 
computers, tutors and literacy. Id. 
 150. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 141–42, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4 
(2004). The Court appointed special Masters to evaluate a study on what resources were 
required to provide an adequate education. Id. at 142, 189 S.W.3d at 4. The Masters recom-
mended additional staff for schools with high concentrations of poverty and measures to 
prevent teachers from migrating from poorer districts. Id. at 146, 148, 189 S.W.3d at 4, 8. 
 151. Id. at 148, 189 S.W.3d at 8. Though an improvement, the Masters questioned wheth-
er the measures would enable poorer school districts to compete with wealthier districts or 
districts in neighboring states. Id. at 158, 189 S.W.3d at 14. 
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education.152 In assessing the effectiveness of the legislation, the court was 
clear that the measures were an effort not to equalize schools, but to estab-
lish a floor each school must meet.153 
C. Socioeconomic Redistricting as a Solution 
Previous methods for dealing with racial segregation are outdated.154 
Race conscious measures are disfavored by the court, and in Arkansas, the 
“carrot and stick approach” has yielded poor results.155 Great benefits, how-
ever, can be derived from the continuation of integration. In his concurring 
opinion in Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy said that the plurality’s hold-
ing “should not prevent school districts from continuing the important work 
of bringing together students of different racial, ethnic, and economic back-
grounds.”156 To combat the effects of re-segregation and improve education-
al opportunities for students of all races, Pulaski County school districts 
should implement a race-neutral action plan. 
Socioeconomic redistricting would be a constitutional method of 
providing much needed resources to low-income schools and would indi-
rectly integrate schools suffering from de facto segregation. Although other 
schools have used alternative race-neutral approaches, this note proposes 
 
 152. Id. at 153, 189 S.W.3d at 12. 
 153. Id. at 155, 189 S.W.3d at 13. The Court noted that some school districts may be able 
to raise additional funds “which may lead to enhanced curricula, facilities, and equipment 
[that] are superior to what is deemed to be adequate by the State.” Id. The goal of achieving 
equity and adequacy has been a key distinction in school finance litigation across the nation. 
See William A. Kaplin, Fiscal Inequity and Resegregation: Two Pressing Mutual Concerns 
of K-12 Education and Higher Education, in OUR PROMISE ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL 
EQUALITY FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN 99, 106 (Maurice R. Dyson & Daniel B. Weddle eds., 
2009). 
 154. See Susan E. Eaton, Slipping Toward Segregation: Local Control and Eroding De-
segregation in Montgomery County, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION THE QUIET REVERSAL 
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 207, 222 (Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, & Harvard Pro-
ject on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) Studies have shown that magnet schools, like the 
ones created in Little Rock, are not powerful enough to draw in voluntary transfers and could 
actually work against desegregation. Id. See also Alison Morantz, Money and Choice in 
Kansas City: Major Investments with Modest Returns, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION THE 
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 241, 243 (Gary Orfield, Susan E. Eaton, 
& Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) (explaining that voluntary magnet 
schools achieved only modest advances in academic achievement and racial segregation). 
 155. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Arkansas, 664 F.3d 738, 752 (8th Cir. 2011). In 2005, 
Pulaski County Special School District opened a new elementary school in a predominately 
African-American area. The cost of the facility broke down to roughly $8,150 per student. Id. 
Compare that to the $25,000 per student cost of a school district that opened seven years later 
in a predominately white area. Id. 
 156. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
140 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
that the best solution would be to redistrict schools with high concentrations 
of low-income students with suburban middle-class schools. 
1. Passing the Legal Requirements 
Socioeconomic redistricting is a constitutional way to achieve integra-
tion and the benefits of better financed schools. Race-based systems are 
tested by strict scrutiny,157 but socioeconomic redistricting would focus on 
race-neutral criteria such as the number of students on free lunches158 or 
census data.159 If the law has the race-neutral purpose of achieving integra-
tion of middle and low-income children,160 the court will find the law consti-
tutional as long as there is a rational basis for the law.161 Adequate resources 
are rationally related to how well schools perform,162 and redistricting to get 
those resources in all schools is a legitimate way to achieve the goal consid-
ering that the continuation of low income schools is economically ineffi-
cient.163 
While it is true that the redistricting would necessarily cross the district 
boundaries in Pulaski County, socioeconomic redistricting would not be 
limited by the intra-district rule in Milliken164 because the plan would still 
pass constitutional muster.165 First, the purpose of redistricting is to better 
finance the county’s schools, not to remedy past segregation.166 Since the 
plan is not remedial action combating a violation, the limitation of Milliken 
would not apply. Second, even if the rule did apply, the Eighth Circuit Court 
 
 157. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 158. When a school is segregated due to de facto segregation, the school must use racially 
neutral means to combat the wrong unless there is some extraordinary showing. Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 159. Black, supra note 121, at 414; see AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N., supra note 12 (So-
cioeconomic status can be measured “as a combination of education, income and occupa-
tion.”). 
 160. Gewirtz, supra note 93, at 773 (stating “educational improvements are relevant in 
their own right, because they also promote a separate remedial goal”). 
 161. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 162. Kahlenberg, Public School Choice, supra note 147, at 250 (“Successful schools 
require an adequate financial base.”). 
 163. Black, supra note 121, at 411 (“The federal government estimates that the cost of 
educating low-income students is approximately forty percent more than middle-income 
students.”). 
 164. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 165. See Gary Orfield, Toward an Integrated Future: New Directions for Courts, Educa-
tors, Civil Rights Groups, Policymakers, and Scholars, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: 
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 331, 345 (Gary Orfield, Susan E. 
Eaton, & Harvard Project on School Desegregation, eds., 1996) [hereinafter Orfield, Toward 
an Integrated Future] (“The most stable desegregation plans are plans that include cities and 
suburbs.”). 
 166. Integration is a secondary benefit of the plan, not the purpose. 
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has already determined that significant intra-district violations had occurred 
between the three districts in Pulaski County, so the scope of this plan 
would be permitted.167 
Furthermore, Arkansas law could provide a basis for the plan. The stat-
utory law allows for the consolidation of districts that are not geographically 
contiguous if it will result “in the overall improvement of the educational 
benefit to students in all of the districts involved.”168 Although the Supreme 
Court of the United States has held that an adequate education is not a fun-
damental right,169 some scholars have suggested that allowing students ac-
cess to adequate resources such as middle-class peers is required by the state 
constitution.170 
Arkansas courts have found that children are entitled to adequate re-
sources.171 Socioeconomic redistricting could be argued as a way to ade-
quately fund Arkansas’s schools.172 Recently, a new wave of litigation has 
focused on the entitlement of adequate education as a way to improve edu-
cation in poor, racially isolated districts.173 If redistricting fails to pass legal 
concerns regarding segregation laws, a strong argument can be made that 
the change is required under state law.174 
2. Producing Integration and Improvement in Education 
Redistricting Pulaski County schools would bring additional resources 
to the schools while indirectly addressing the harmful impacts of segrega-
tion. The change would increase resources by providing a range of low-
income and middle-income students to each school district.175 Creating mid-
 
 167. Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 921 F.2d 1371, 1377 
(8th Cir. 1990). 
 168. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-13-1404(f)(1) (Repl. 2007 & Supp. 2013). 
 169. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). 
 170. Ryan, supra note 11, at 259. “Whereas school desegregation cases sought equality 
indirectly through integration, school finance cases directly attacked the apparent source of 
the inequality: the distribution of education resources.” Id. 
 171. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 155, 189 S.W.3d 1, 12–13 
(2004). 
 172. Ryan, supra note 11, at 260 (noting that in current desegregation litigation the “end 
goal changed from integration to reparation; indeed, a number of these cases have come to 
resemble isolated versions of school finance litigation”). 
 173. Id. The author recommends this type of litigation over desegregation because “some 
federal courts have used school desegregation decrees to circumvent the limitations imposed 
by Rodriguez or similar state-court decisions rejecting school finance challenges.” Id. at 264. 
 174. See Kaplin, supra note 153, at 99–100. Kaplin points out that “school finance litiga-
tion displaced desegregation litigation as the major instrument for enhancing equal educa-
tional opportunity.” Id. 
 175. See Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1570–71. 
Kahlenberg points out that “part of receiving an adequate education is having access to ‘re-
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dle-class schools would increase funding per pupil and cost less to oper-
ate.176 Finally, redistricting would provide integrated schools. 
Low-income students would reap benefits from working in an envi-
ronment with middle-income peers.177 Middle-income students bring intan-
gible “educational capital” to the schools they attend.178 Those students and 
their parents attract better qualified teachers and higher expectations on 
school officials, which have an indirect positive impact on the other students 
in those schools.179 Also, students enrolled in middle-class schools are more 
likely to have access to college prep classes and an environment with chil-
dren that have high goals and support.180 
Arkansas’s current approach to funding, though it addresses the issue 
of poverty, fails on two fronts.181 First, research has shown that spending 
money directly on low-income schools does not improve results.182 In states 
where inner-city schools were funded at higher amounts than their suburban 
counterparts, the inner-city schools continued to score lower on standardized 
tests.183 Second, the adequate education reforms do not consider the ad-
vantages student integration has on achievement.184 The school districts re-
ceive none of the positive byproducts of racial integration.185 For example, 
in St. Louis, a study found that when a minority student transferred to a sub-
urban school district, the student consistently performed better than his or 
her peers in inner-city schools.186 
 
sources’ provided in mixed-income schools like positive peer influences, active school parent 
volunteers, and high-quality teachers who teach a rigorous curriculum. Id. 
 176. Black, supra note 121, at 410–11. 
 177. James, supra note 119, at 227. 
 178. Black, supra note 121, at 409. 
 179. Id. at 377, 409. 
 180. Ryan, supra note 11, at 298. 
 181. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 358 Ark. 137, 142, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4 
(2004). Arkansas increased funding to poorer districts and focused on incentives to prevent 
teacher migration. Id. 
 182. See Ryan, supra note 11, at 290 (suggesting that the effects of segregation “cannot 
be adequately addressed by school finance reform . . . .”). 
 183. Id. at 290–91. Ryan details the expenditures of the school district at the heart of the 
Missouri decision. The school districts “[h]aving been denied relief that would very likely 
have been cheaper and more effective, they were granted a bonanza of funds” to convert to 
magnet schools. Id. at 290. While the students saw some improved performance, the students 
still failed to improve relative to other students in their states. Id. 
 184. See id.  
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. at 298–99. Ryan also points out that in a similar San Francisco case study “stu-
dents from low socioeconomic backgrounds posted significant gains in achievement when 
they transferred to schools with more advantaged and higher-achieving students.” The per-
formance was better “despite the fact that the transfer schools received no increase in fund-
ing.” Id. at 299. 
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Per pupil funding would be more efficient if central Arkansas schools 
converted from a system that uses proximity to the school as the sole factor 
to one that uses socioeconomic status. Instead of increased funding through 
tax hikes, socioeconomic redistricting could better allocate current re-
sources.187 Some states have created financial incentives for accepting low-
income students by using a “weighted student-funding formula.”188 With this 
method, schools receive additional funds for accepting low-income stu-
dents.189 Other states have the school districts compete for transfers by hav-
ing state funds follow the student to the new district.190 If adopted in Arkan-
sas, the increased funding at the school level would entice better teachers 
and improve test results at historically poor schools.191 Additionally, eco-
nomic incentives have been proven to increase the incentive for school dis-
tricts to accept low income students.192 Rather than rely on tax increases, 
Arkansas could reallocate the $38 million it currently spends in desegrega-
tion to fund the redistricting plan.193 
Since many lower-income schools are segregated, socioeconomic re-
districting would also indirectly increase diversity.194 The neighborhood 
school system encourages racial isolation.195 Changing the system will 
change the makeup of the school. Low-income students are more likely to 
be minority, so integrating low-income students with middle-income ones 
would necessarily integrate students by race.196 In addition, over time as 
schools improve, wealthier families would have less reason to flee inner-city 
schools, and the school districts would stabilize with a middle-class student 
body.197 
 
 187. See infra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 188. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1564. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1565. 
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 195. Orfield, Toward an Integrated Future, supra note 165, at 331. Orfield points out that 
minority children are isolated into high poverty schools while “[a]lmost no whites end up in 
such schools under the neighborhood system.” Id. 
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One district similar to Little Rock has found the socioeconomic redis-
tricting model successful.198 Wake County Public School System is similar 
to Little Rock schools in that it was also under a court ordered desegregation 
plan.199 Unlike Arkansas, North Carolina actually cut funding from Wake 
County’s budget for failure to integrate.200 Wake County schools obtained 
unitary status like Little Rock schools and were no longer under a desegre-
gation plan.201 Because the schools were no longer under a court order to 
desegregate, Wake County was obligated to use race-neutral plans to main-
tain any diversity.202 In 1999, Wake County implemented a socioeconomic 
status in its assignment plans for all schools.203 
The plan was seen as a success and “had been lauded as a national 
model.”204 In 2005, Wake County’s low-income and minority students 
passed exams at a higher rate than in surrounding traditional school dis-
tricts.205 That success, however, was short lived. In order to maintain socio-
economically diverse schools, the district had to reassign students often.206 
Parents wanted stability and neighborhood schools that would not require 
busing students long distances.207 These problems led to the demise of soci-
oeconomic redistricting in Wake County.208 
“All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well 
be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things 
are not equal in a system that has been deliberately constructed and main-
tained to enforce racial segregation.”209 School district boundaries should 
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 199. Russo, supra note 37, at 544. 
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in a state of constant change.” Orfield, Segregated Housing, supra note 120, at 291. 
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of their neighborhood.” Id. at 550. 
 209. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). 
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evolve with the needs of the community.210 The Seminole County Florida 
school district is an example of an adaptable socioeconomic redistricting 
plan.211 The school district adopted “‘attendance zones’” that can be modi-
fied when a residential area does not provide diversity.212 The school district 
allows the school board to change attendance zones and merge large areas, 
and allows for socioeconomic transfers as needed.213 With control still in-
vested in the local school board, the Seminole County plan may prove to be 
more sustainable than the Wake County plan.214 
3. Garnering Community Support 
While the benefits of socioeconomic integration have been acknowl-
edged, communities seem reluctant to redistrict schools. One argument, that 
“lasting school integration requires sorting out the links between schools 
and housing changes,”215 has prompted some states to address the neighbor-
hood issue on the front end, by enacting legislation that requires portions of 
new developments to be set aside for low income households.216 Other dis-
tricts have opted for public school choice as another alternative to redistrict-
ing. 
The theory behind school choice is that if schools were allowed to 
compete for students, then successful schools would be emulated and all 
schools would benefit.217 The problem is that schools do not act like a tradi-
 
 210. Saiger, supra note 7, at 495–96. Saiger points out that “[s]chool district boundaries, 
like the boundaries of electoral districts, should be periodically redrawn. But whereas elec-
toral redistricting periodically restores interdistrict equivalence in population, school redis-
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Pulaski County school districts, the school is a post unitary school located in central Florida 
with a large and diverse student population. Id. 
 212. Id. at 900. 
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Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569. 
 216. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, supra note 123, at 1569. 
 217. See 2013 Ark. Acts 1227 at sec. 6 (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-
227(b)(2)(A)(i) (Repl. 2007 & Supp. 2013)) (“Giving more options to parents and students 
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tional market.218 School choice provides no mechanism for improvement.219 
As the more successful schools attract students, the unsuccessful districts 
“become ever more poor and distressed.”220 
Additionally, space in schools is limited.221 One proponent of socioec-
onomic integration has aptly pointed out that “it is patently clear that there 
simply are not enough good schools into which students can transfer.”222 
School choice laws do not address what happens to the spillover students 
when the successful schools reach capacity.223 Finally, school choice would 
be an ineffective solution to segregation because school integration would 
not be a natural result.224 Parents would still be likely to pick schools based 
on status and not educational results.225 
With these drawbacks, it becomes apparent that school choice would 
be an inadequate plan for Pulaski County schools. As one commenter stated, 
“freedom of choice plans were unacceptable if there were other ways, such 
as zoning, that were reasonably available and would result in a speedier and 
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system.”226 
A long term socioeconomic redistricting plan can be implemented suc-
cessfully in Pulaski County by focusing on efficiency, adaptability, and 
community involvement. Redistricting would achieve the most benefit using 
the least disruptive method. As this note shows, Pulaski County students 
would receive many benefits from redistricting. Like the Seminole County 
plan, the local school boards could maintain local control in the redistricting 
decisions. 
Finally, a key way to combat the pitfalls of parental disagreement is to 
involve the community.227 Communities and school districts have worked 
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together in finance litigation in the past,228 demonstrating that it is possible 
to garner community support to improve academic achievement. This goal 
far outweighs the inconveniences the middle class may suffer through, such 
as extended busing.229 As Justice Marshall said in his dissenting opinion in 
Milliken, “We deal here with the right of all of our children, whatever their 
race, to an equal start in life and to an equal opportunity to reach their full 
potential as citizens.”230 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas school districts are in a unique position to not only improve 
the education of the students, but also to shed its torrid history. Rather than 
being a reminder of past wrongs that should not be repeated, Little Rock can 
be a shining example for others to emulate. The Supreme Court appears to 
be stepping aside in the efforts to integrate, and school districts will now be 
asked whether to continue improving in a neutral way or stick with the 
status quo. Socioeconomic redistricting plans should be the path taken for 
Pulaski County school districts. Redistricting would allow for Pulaski 
County to improve academic achievement, eliminate the need to spend tax 
dollars in desegregation efforts, and still integrate public schools. 
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